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Abstract. We study Pareto optimal matchings in the context of house
allocation problems. We present an O(
√
nm) algorithm, based on Gale’s
Top Trading Cycles Method, for finding a maximum cardinality Pareto
optimal matching, where n is the number of agents and m is the total
length of the preference lists. By contrast, we show that the problem
of finding a minimum cardinality Pareto optimal matching is NP-hard,
though approximable within a factor of 2. We then show that there exist
Pareto optimal matchings of all sizes between a minimum and maximum
cardinality Pareto optimal matching. Finally, we introduce the concept
of a signature, which allows us to give a characterization, checkable in
linear time, of instances that admit a unique Pareto optimal matching.
1 Introduction
We study the problem of allocating a set H of heterogeneous indivisible goods
among a set A of agents [14, 8, 3, 4]. We assume that each agent a ∈ A ranks in
order of preference a subset of H (the acceptable goods for a) and that monetary
compensations are not possible. In the literature the situation in which each
agent initially owns one good is known as a housing market [14, 12, 11]. When
there are no initial property rights, we obtain the house allocation problem [8,
16, 1]. A mixed model, in which a subset of agents initially owns a good has also
been studied [2]. Yuan [15] describes a large-scale application of these problems
in the allocation of families to government-subsidized housing in China.
Following convention we refer to the elements of H as houses, though the
class of problems under consideration could equally be formulated in terms of
allocating graduates to trainee positions, professors to offices, clients to servers,
etc. For ease of exposition we begin by assuming that there are no initial property
rights, though we later show how to take account of such a situation.
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Given such a problem instance, the task is to construct a matching, i.e. a
subset M of A×H such that (a, h) ∈M implies that a finds h acceptable, each
agent is assigned to at most one house and vice versa. Furthermore one seeks
a matching that is optimal in a precise sense, taking into account the agents’
preferences. Various notions of optimality have been considered in the literature,
but a criterion that has received much attention, particularly from economists, is
Pareto optimality. A matchingM is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching
M ′ such that no agent is worse off in M ′ than in M , whilst some agent is better
off in M ′ than in M . For example, a matching M is not Pareto optimal if two
agents could improve by swapping the houses that they are assigned to in M .
There is a straightforward greedy algorithm, which we denote by Greedy-
POM, for finding a Pareto optimal matching [1]: consider each agent a in turn,
giving a his/her most-preferred vacant house (assuming such a house exists).
This algorithm is also known as a serial dictatorship mechanism [1]. Roth and
Sotomayor [13, Example 4.3] remark that a similar mechanism is used by the
United States Naval Academy in order to match graduating students to their
first posts as Naval Officers (in this context however, the algorithm considers
each student in non-decreasing order of graduation results). However one may
construct an example instance (see Section 2 for further details) in which Pareto
optimal matchings may have different cardinalities and Greedy-POM could fail
to produce a Pareto optimal matching of maximum size. Yet in many applica-
tions, one wishes to match as many agents as possible.
Stronger notions of optimality have been considered in the literature. For
example a matching M is rank-maximal [10] if, in M , the maximum number of
agents are matched to their first-choice house, and subject to this condition, the
maximum number of agents are matched to their second-choice house, and so on.
Irving et al. [10] describe two algorithms for finding a rank-maximal matching,
with complexities O(min{n + C,C√n}m) and O(Cnm), where n = |A| + |H|,
m is the total length of the preference lists and C is the maximum k such that
some agent is assigned to his/her kth-choice house in the constructed matching.
Clearly a rank-maximal matching is Pareto optimal, however a rank-maximal
matching need not be a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching (hence-
forth a maximum Pareto optimal matching). Alternatively, one may consider
a maximum cardinality maximum utility matching M , in which we maximise∑
(a,h)∈M ua,h over all maximum cardinality matchings, where ua,h indicates the
utility of house h being allocated to agent a. If one defines ua,h = k − ranka,h,
where ranka,h is the rank of house h in agent a’s preference list and k is the
maximum length of an agent’s list, then a maximum cardinality maximum util-
ity matching is in turn a maximum Pareto optimal matching. Since all utilities
are integral, a maximum cardinality maximum utility matching may be found
in O(
√
nm log n) time [5]. However if one only requires to find a maximum car-
dinality matching that satisfies the weaker condition of being Pareto optimal, it
is of interest to consider whether faster algorithms exist.
The next two sections of this paper work towards answering this question.
In Section 2 we give a formal definition of the problem model, and present nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for a matching to be Pareto optimal. In Section
3 we use these conditions as the basis for an O(
√
nm) algorithm for finding a
maximum Pareto optimal matching. This algorithm extends the Top Trading
Cycles Method due to Gale [14], which has been the focus of much attention,
particularly in the game theory and economics literature [14, 12, 11, 15, 2]. We
then show that any improvement to the complexity of our algorithm would imply
an improved algorithm for finding a maximum matching in a bipartite graph.
We also demonstrate how to modify our algorithm in order to take account of
initial property rights, guaranteeing that those who own a good initially will end
up with a good that is either the same or better.
In the remainder of the paper, we prove several related results. In Section 4
we consider the problem of finding a minimum Pareto optimal matching, show-
ing that this problem is NP-hard, though approximable within a factor of 2. In
Section 5 we prove an interpolation result, showing that there exist Pareto op-
timal matchings of all sizes between a minimum and maximum Pareto optimal
matching. Finally, in Section 6 we give a characterization, checkable in linear
time, of instances that admit a unique Pareto optimal matching.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with a formal definition of the problem model under consideration.
An instance I of the pareto optimal matching problem (POM) comprises
a bipartite graph G = (A,H,E), where A = {a1, a2, . . . , ar} is the set of agents
and H = {h1, h2, . . . , hs} is the set of houses. For each ai ∈ A, we denote by
Ai ⊆ H the vertices adjacent to ai – these are referred to as the acceptable houses
for ai. Moreover ai has a linear order over Ai. We let n = r + s and m = |E|.
Henceforth we assume that G contains no isolated vertices.
An assignment M is a subset of A×H such that (ai, hj) ∈M only if ai finds
hj acceptable (i.e. hj ∈ Ai). If (ai, hj) ∈M , we say that ai and hj are assigned
to one another. For each q ∈ A ∪ H, let M(q) denote the assignees of q in M .
A matching is an assignment M such that |M(q)| ≤ 1 for each q ∈ A ∪ H. If
M(q) = ∅, we say that q is unmatched in M , otherwise q is matched in M .
Let M be a matching in I. M is maximal if there is no (agent,house)
pair (ai, hj) such that ai and hj are both unmatched in M and hj ∈ Ai.
Also M is trade-in-free if there is no (agent,house) pair (ai, hj) such that ai
is matched in M , hj is unmatched in M , and ai prefers hj to M(ai). Finally M
is coalition-free if M admits no coalition, which is a sequence of matched agents
C = 〈a0, a1, . . . , ak−1〉, for some k ≥ 2, such that ai prefers M(ai+1) to M(ai)
(0 ≤ i ≤ k−1) (here, and in the remainder of this paper, all subscripts are taken
modulo k when reasoning about coalitions). The matching
M ′ = (M\{(ai,M(ai)) : 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1}) ∪ {(ai,M(ai+1)) : 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1}
is defined to be the matching obtained from M by satisfying C.
The preferences of an agent extend to matchings as follows. Given two match-
ingsM andM ′, we say that an agent ai prefersM ′ toM if either (i) ai is matched
in M ′ and unmatched in M , or (ii) ai is matched in both M and M ′ and prefers
M ′(ai) to M(ai). Given this definition, we may define a relation ≺ on the set of
all matchings as follows: M ′ ≺M if and only if no agent prefers M to M ′, and
some agent prefers M ′ to M . It is straightforward to then prove the following.
Proposition 1. Given an instance I of POM, the relation ≺ forms a partial
order over the set of matchings in I.
A matching is defined to be Pareto optimal if and only if it is ≺-minimal. In-
tuitively a matching is Pareto optimal if no agent ai can be better off without
requiring another agent aj to be worse off. The following proposition gives nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for a matching to be Pareto optimal.
Proposition 2. Let M be a matching in a given instance of POM. Then M is
Pareto optimal if and only if M is maximal, trade-in-free and coalition-free.
Proof. Let M be a Pareto optimal matching. If M is not maximal, then there
exists an agent ai and a house hj , both unmatched in M , such that hj ∈ Ai.
Let M ′ = M ∪ {(ai, hj)}. If M is not trade-in-free, then there exist an agent
ai and a house hj , such that ai is matched in M , hj is unmatched in M , and
ai prefers hj to M(ai). Let M ′ = (M\{(ai,M(ai))}) ∪ {(ai, hj)}. Finally if M
admits some coalition C, let M ′ be the matching obtained by satisfying C. In
all three cases, M ′ ≺M , a contradiction.
Conversely letM be a matching that is maximal, trade-in-free and coalition-
free, and suppose for a contradiction that M is not Pareto optimal. Then there
exists some matchingM ′ such thatM ′ ≺M . Let a0 be any agent matched inM
who prefers M ′ to M . Note that such an agent must exist, since M is maximal
and at least one agent prefers M ′ to M .
It follows that M ′(a0) is matched in M , say to a1, for otherwise M is not
trade-in-free. Therefore, M ′(a1) 6= M(a1), and so a1 must also prefer M ′ to
M . Using this same argument, M ′(a1) is matched in M , say to a2. We can
continue in this manner finding a sequence of agents 〈a0, a1, a2, . . .〉, where ai
prefers M(ai+1) to M(ai). Since the number of agents is finite, this sequence
must cycle, thereby contradicting the assumption that M is coalition-free. uunionsq
Henceforth we will establish the Pareto optimality of a given matching by show-
ing that the conditions of the above proposition are satisfied. For a given match-
ing M , we can trivially check whether M satisfies the maximality and trade-in-
free properties in O(m) time. To check for the absence of coalitions, we construct
the envy graph of M . This is a directed graph, denoted by G(M), consisting of
one vertex for each agent, with an edge from ai to aj whenever aj is matched in
M and either (i) ai is unmatched in M and finds M(aj) acceptable, or (ii) ai is
matched in M and prefers M(aj) to M(ai). It is clear that M is coalition-free if
and only if G(M) is acyclic. So we can perform this last check in O(m) time by
using a cycle-detection algorithm on G(M). Putting these observations together,
we have the following result.
Proposition 3. Let M be a matching in a given instance of POM. Then we
may check whether M is Pareto optimal in O(m) time.
It is easy to construct an instance of POM in which the Pareto optimal
matchings are of different sizes. For example let A = {a1, a2} and let H =
{h1, h2}. Suppose that a1 prefers h1 to h2, whilst a2 finds only h1 acceptable.
Then both M1 = {(a1, h1)} and M2 = {(a1, h2), (a2, h1)} are Pareto optimal.
Given this observation it is natural to consider the complexity of each of the
problems of finding a maximum and minimum Pareto optimal matching. (Note
that Greedy-POM produces M1 given the agent ordering 〈a1, a2〉, and produces
M2 given the agent ordering 〈a2, a1〉.)
3 Maximum Pareto optimal matchings
In this section, we describe a three-phase algorithm for finding a maximum
Pareto optimal matching, mirroring the three necessary and sufficient conditions
in Proposition 2. We let I be an instance of POM, and we assume the notation
and terminology introduced in Section 2. Phase 1 involves using the Hopcroft-
Karp algorithm [7] to compute a maximum matchingM in G. This phase, which
guarantees that M is maximal, takes O(
√
nm) time and dominates the runtime.
The final two phases transformM into a trade-in-free and coalition-free matching
respectively. We describe these phases in more detail below.
3.1 Phase 2 of the algorithm
In this phase, we transform M into a trade-in-free matching by repeatedly iden-
tifying and promoting agents that prefer an unmatched house to their existing
assignment. Each promotion breaks the existing assignment, thereby freeing a
house, which itself may be a preferred assignment for a different agent. With the
aid of suitable data structures, we can ensure that the next agent and house can
be identified efficiently.
For each house h, we maintain a linked list Lh of pairs (a, r), where a is a
matched agent who finds h acceptable, and r is the rank of h in a’s preference
list. Initially the pairs in Lh involve only those matched agents a who prefer h
to M(a), though subsequently the pairs in Lh may contain agents a who prefer
M(a) to h. The initialization of these lists can be carried out using one traversal
of the agent preference lists, which we assume are represented as doubly linked
lists or arrays, in O(m) time.
For each matched agent a, we also use this traversal to initialize a variable,
denoted by curra, which stores the rank of M(a) in a’s preference list. This
variable is maintained during the execution of the algorithm. We also assume
that, for each matched agent a we store M(a). One final initialization remains:
construct a stack S of all unmatched houses h where Lh is non-empty. We now
enter the loop described in Figure 1.
During each loop iteration we pop an unmatched house h from S and remove
the first pair (a, r) from the list Lh (which must be non-empty). If a prefers h
to M(a) (i.e. r < curra) then a is promoted from h′ = M(a) to h, also M and
curra are updated, and finally h′, which is now unmatched, is pushed onto S if
Lh′ is non-empty. Otherwise h is pushed back onto S if Lh is non-empty.
while S 6= ∅
h := S.pop();
(a, r) := Lh.removeHead();
if r < curra
// h is unmatched in M , a is matched in M and prefers h to M(a)
h′ :=M(a);
M := (M\{(a, h′)}) ∪ {(a, h)};
curra := r;
h := h′;
if Lh 6= ∅
S.push(h);
Fig. 1. Phase 2 loop
Each iteration of the loop removes a pair from a list Lh. Since agent preference
lists are finite and no new pair is added to a list Lh during a loop iteration, the
while loop must eventually terminate with S empty. At this point no matched
agent a would trade M(a) for an unmatched house, and so M is trade-in-free.
Additionally, M remains a maximum matching, since any agent matched at the
end of Phase 1 is also matched at the end of Phase 2. Finally, it is clear that
this phase runs in O(m) time given the data structures described above.
3.2 Phase 3 of the algorithm
In this phase, we transform M into a coalition-free matching. Recall that coali-
tions inM correspond to cycles in the envy graph G(M). So a natural algorithm
involves repeatedly finding and satisfying coalitions in G(M) until no more coali-
tions remain. This algorithm has a runtime of O(m2), since there are O(m)
coalitions, and cycle-detection takes O(m) time.
A better starting point for an efficient algorithm is Gale’s Top Trading Cy-
cles Method [14]. This method is also based on repeatedly finding and satisfying
coalitions, however the number of iterations is reduced by the following observa-
tion: no agent assigned to his/her first choice can be in a coalition. We remove
such agents from consideration, and since the houses assigned to them are no
longer exchangeable, they can be deleted from the preference lists of the re-
maining agents. This observation can now be recursively applied to the reduced
preference lists. At some point, either no agents remain, in which case the match-
ing is coalition-free, or no agent is assigned to his/her reduced first choice (i.e.
the first choice on his/her reduced preference list).
In this last case, it turns out that there must be a coalition C in M , which
can be found in O(r) time by searching the envy graph restricted to reduced
first-choice edges. After satisfying C, each agent in C is assigned to his/her
reduced first choice. Therefore, no agent is in more than one coalition, giving
O(r) coalitions overall. The runtime of this preliminary implementation then is
Ω(m+ r2). We now present a linear-time extension of Yuan’s description of the
Top Trading Cycles Method [15].
In our implementation, deletions of houses from agents’ preference lists are
not explicitly carried out. Instead, a house that is no longer exchangeable is
for each matched agent a such that p(a) 6=M(a)
P := {a}; // P is a stack of agents
c(a) := 1; // counters record the number of times an agent is in P
while P 6= ∅
a′ := P.pop();
p(a′) := most-preferred unlabelled house on preference list of a′;
if c(a′) = 2
C := coalition in P containing a′;
satisfy C;
for each a′′ ∈ C
label M(a′′);
c(a′′) := 0;
P.pop();
else if p(a′) =M(a′)
label M(a′);
c(a′) := 0;
else
P.push(a′);
a′′ :=M(p(a′));
c(a′′) := c(a′′) + 1;
P.push(a′′);
Fig. 2. Phase 3 loop
labelled (all houses are initially unlabelled). For each agent a we maintain a
pointer p(a) to the first unlabelled house on a’s preference list – this is equivalent
to the first house on a’s reduced preference list. Initially p(a) points to the first
house on a’s preference list, and subsequently p(a) traverses left to right. Also,
in order to identify coalitions, we initialize a counter c(a) to 0 for each agent a.
Then, we enter the main body of the algorithm, as given in Figure 2.
This algorithm repeatedly searches for coalitions, building a path P of agents
(represented by a stack) in the envy graph restricted to reduced first-choice edges.
At each iteration of the while loop, we pop an agent a′ from the stack and move
up p(a′) if necessary. If P cycles (i.e. we find c(a′) = 2), there is a coalition C –
the agents involved in C are removed from consideration and the houses assigned
to these agents are labelled (in practice the agents in C can be identified and C
can be satisfied during the stack popping operations). Alternatively, if P reaches
a dead-end (a′ is already assigned to his/her first choice), this agent is removed
from consideration and his/her assigned house is labelled. Otherwise, we keep
extending the path by following the reduced first-choice edges.
At the termination of this phase we note that M is coalition-free by the
correctness of the Top Trading Cycles Method [14]. AlsoM remains a maximum
trade-in-free matching, since each agent and house matched at the end of Phase 2
is also matched at the end of Phase 3. Finally, it is clear this phase runs in O(m)
time given the data structures described above. We summarize the preceding
discussion in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. A maximum Pareto optimal matching can be found in O(
√
nm)
time. Such a matching is also a maximum matching of agents to houses.
We now show that any improvement to the complexity of the above algo-
rithm would imply an improved algorithm for finding a maximum matching in
a bipartite graph. Without loss of generality, let G = (A,H,E) be an arbitrary
bipartite graph with no isolated vertices. Construct an instance I of POM with
bipartite graph G, where each agent a’s preference list in I is an arbitrary per-
mutation over a’s neighbours in G. By Theorem 1, any maximum Pareto optimal
matching in I is also a maximum matching in G. Since I may be constructed
from G in O(m) time, the complexity of finding a maximum matching in a bi-
partite graph is bounded above by the complexity of finding a maximum Pareto
optimal matching.
3.3 Initial property rights
Suppose that a subset A′ of the agents already own a house. We now describe
an individually rational modification of our algorithm, which ensures that every
agent in A′ ends up with the same house or better.
We begin with a matching M that pre-assigns every agent a ∈ A′ to his/her
existing house h. We then truncate the preference list of each such a by removing
all houses less preferable than M(a). Now, we enter Phase 1, where we use the
Hopcroft-Karp algorithm to exhaustively augment M into some matching M ′.
Members of A′ must still be matched inM ′, and since their preference lists were
truncated, their new assignments must be at least as preferable as those in M .
Note that M ′ may not be a maximum matching of A to H, however M ′ does
have maximum cardinality among all matchings that respect the initial property
rights. The remaining two phases do not move any agent from being matched to
unmatched, and so the result follows immediately.
In the special case that all agents own a house initially (i.e. I is an instance
of a housing market), it is clear that Phases 1 and 2 of the algorithm are not
necessary. Moreover it is known that Phase 3 produces the unique matching that
belongs to the core of the market [12], a stronger notion than Pareto optimality.
4 Minimum Pareto optimal matchings
In this section, we consider the problem of finding a minimum Pareto optimal
matching. Let MIN-POM denote the problem deciding, given an instance I of
POM and an integer K, whether I admits a Pareto optimal matching of size at
most K. We firstly prove that MIN-POM is NP-complete via a reduction from
MMM, which is the problem of deciding, given a graph G and an integer K,
whether G admits a maximal matching of size at most K.
Theorem 2. MIN-POM is NP-complete.
Proof. By Proposition 3, MIN-POM belongs to NP. To show NP-hardness, we
give a reduction from the NP-complete restriction of MMM to subdivision graphs
[6] (given a graph G, the subdivision graph of G is obtained by subdividing
each edge e = {u,w} into two edges {u, ve}, {ve, w}, where ve is a new vertex
corresponding to e).
Let G = (V,E) (a subdivision graph) and K (a positive integer) be given
as an instance of MMM. Then V is a disjoint union of two sets U and W ,
where each edge e ∈ E joins a vertex in U to a vertex in W . Assume that
U = {u1, u2, . . . , ur} and W = {w1, w2, . . . , ws}. Without loss of generality
assume that each vertex ui ∈ U has degree 2, and moreover assume that pi and
qi are two sequences such that pi < qi, {ui, wpi} ∈ E and {ui, wqi} ∈ E.
We create an instance I of MIN-POM as follows. Let A be the set of agents
and let H be the set of houses, where A = A1 ∪ A2, At = {at1, at2, . . . , atr}
(t = 1, 2), H = W ∪ X and X = {x1, x2, . . . , xr}. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ r), we
create preference lists for agents a1i and a
2
i as follows:
a1i : xi wpi wqi a
2
i : xi wqi wpi
We claim that G has a maximal matching of size at most K if and only if I has
a Pareto optimal matching of size at most K + r.
For, suppose that M is a maximal matching in G of size at most K. We
construct a set M ′ as follows. For any ui ∈ U that is unmatched in M , add the
pair (a1i , xi) to M
′. Now suppose that (ui, wj) ∈ M . If j = pi, add the pairs
(a1i , wj) and (a
2
i , xi) to M
′. If j = qi, add the pairs (a1i , xi) and (a
2
i , wj) to M
′.
ClearlyM ′ is a matching in I, and |M ′| = |M |+r ≤ K+r. It is straightforward
to verify that, by the maximality of M in G, M ′ is Pareto optimal in I.
Conversely suppose thatM ′ is a Pareto optimal matching in I of size at most
K+r. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ r), either (a1i , xi) ∈M ′ or (a2i , xi) ∈M ′, for otherwise
M ′ is not trade-in-free. Hence we may construct a matching M in G as follows.
For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ r), if (ati, wj) ∈ M ′ for some t (1 ≤ t ≤ 2), add (ui, wj) to
M . Then |M | = |M ′| − r ≤ K. The maximality of M ′ clearly implies that M is
maximal in G. uunionsq
For a given instance I of POM with bipartite graph G, we denote by p−(I)
and p+(I) the sizes of a minimum and maximum Pareto optimal matching in
I respectively. Similarly, we denote by β−1 (G) and β1(G) the sizes of a mini-
mum maximal and a maximum matching in G respectively. It is known that
β−1 (G) ≥ β1(G)/2 [9]. By Proposition 2, Pareto optimal matchings in I are
maximal matchings in G. Hence, by Theorem 1, we have that β−1 (G) ≤ p−(I) ≤
p+(I) = β1(G). It is therefore immediate that, for a given instance I of POM,
the problem of finding a minimum Pareto optimal matching is approximable
within a factor of 2.
5 Interpolation of Pareto optimal matchings
In this section, we prove that, for a given instance I of POM, there are Pareto
optimal matchings of all sizes between p−(I) and p+(I).
Given a matching M , an augmenting path P for M is an alternating se-
quence of distinct agents and houses 〈a1, h1, a2, . . . , ak, hk〉, where a1 and hk are
unmatched in M , hi ∈ Ai, and M(ai+1) = hi (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1). We associate
with each such augmenting path a vector rankP , whose ith component contains
the rank of ai for hi. Given two augmenting paths P and Q for M , we say that
P / Q if (i) both P and Q begin from the same agent, and (ii) rankP is lexico-
graphically less than rankQ. Also for paths P and Q, we define three operations:
PrefixP (v) is the substring of P from a1 to v ∈ P , SuffixP (v) is the substring of
P from v ∈ P to hk, and P ·Q denotes the concatenation of P and Q.
Theorem 3. For a given instance I of POM, there exist Pareto optimal match-
ings of size k, for each p−(I) ≤ k ≤ p+(I).
Proof. Let M be any Pareto optimal matching such that |M | < p+(I), and let
M ′ be the matching that results from augmenting M along some /-minimal
augmenting path P . We will show in turn that M ′ is maximal, trade-in-free and
coalition-free; the result then follows by induction.
If M ′ is not maximal, then clearly we contradict the maximality of M . Now
suppose that M ′ is not trade-in-free. Then there exists an agent a and house
h, where a is matched in M ′, h is unmatched in M ′, and a prefers h to M ′(a).
Since h is also unmatched in M , a must be in P , for otherwise M(a) = M ′(a),
andM is not trade-in-free. But then P ′ = PrefixP (a) · 〈h〉 is an augmenting path
for M , contradicting the /-minimality of P .
Finally suppose for a contradiction that M ′ is not coalition-free. Then there
exists a coalition C = 〈a0, a1, . . . , ak−1〉 with respect toM ′. At least one agent in
P must also be in C, for otherwiseM is not coalition-free. Let ai be the first such
agent in P . We establish some properties of M ′(ai+1). Firstly, M ′(ai+1) must
be matched in M , for otherwise M admits the augmenting path PrefixP (ai) ·
〈M ′(ai+1)〉, contradicting the /-minimality of P . Also, M ′(ai+1) cannot appear
before ai in P , for otherwise ai is not the first agent in P to be in C. Lastly,
M ′(ai+1) cannot appear after ai in P , for otherwise M admits the augmenting
path PrefixP (ai)· SuffixP (M ′(ai+1)), contradicting the /-minimality of P . So, it
must be the case that M ′(ai+1) is matched in M and does not appear in P . Let
ai+j be the first agent in C after ai, such that ai+j is in P . Note that ai+j 6= ai+1
by the above properties ofM ′(ai+1), but since C is a cycle, ai+j = ai is possible.
It follows that the subsequence S = 〈M ′(ai+1), ai+1, . . . ,M ′(ai+j−1), ai+j−1〉 of
C is disjoint from P , and so P ′ = PrefixP (ai) · S· SuffixP (M ′(ai+j)) is a valid
augmenting path of M . But then P ′ contradicts the /-minimality of P , since ai
prefers M ′(ai+1) to M ′(ai). uunionsq
Corollary 1. Given an instance I of POM and a Pareto optimal matching M
in I of size k, we can construct a Pareto optimal matching M ′ of size k + 1, or
determine that no such matching exists, in O(m) time.
Proof. Let G be the bipartite graph in I, with edges in M directed from H
to A, and edges not in M directed from A to H. Also associate with each
non-matching edge (ai, hj) the rank of ai for hj . We search for a /-minimal
augmenting path by performing an ordered depth first search of G starting from
the set of unmatched agents, where for each agent a in the search, we explore
outgoing edges from a in increasing order of rank. In general, ordered depth-first
search is asymptotically slower than depth-first search. However, the O(m) result
holds, since each preference list is already given in increasing order of rank. uunionsq
We remark that the results of this section extend to the case where a subset
of the agents have initial property rights.
6 Uniqueness of Pareto optimal matchings
In this section, we give a characterization of instances with no initial property
rights that admit a unique Pareto optimal matching. This is based on the concept
of a signature of a Pareto optimal matching.
If a matching M is Pareto optimal, the envy graph G(M) contains no cycles,
and therefore admits a topological ordering. We say that a reversed topological
ordering of G(M), denoted by σ(M), is a signature of M . The next lemma will
help us establish that the signature of a matching is unique for that matching.
This lemma is similar to [1, Lemma 1], though the proof here, which uses the
concept of a signature, is much simpler.
Lemma 1. Given an instance I of POM, the algorithm Greedy-POM can gen-
erate any Pareto optimal matching in I.
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary Pareto optimal matching in I. We claim that by
processing the agents in order of σ(M), the greedy algorithm returns M .
Suppose for a contradiction that Greedy-POM returns a matching M ′ 6=M .
It follows that sinceM ′ is Pareto optimal, some agent must preferM ′ toM . Let
a be the first such agent in σ(M).
Now,M ′(a) must be matched inM , say to a′, for otherwiseM is not maximal
(if a is unmatched inM), orM is not trade-in-free (if a is matched inM). G(M)
must therefore contain an edge from a to a′, meaning that a′ precedes a in σ(M).
At the time a′ is processed by Greedy-POM, M ′(a) is unmatched (since it is
assigned later to a). So, a′ must prefer M ′(a′) to M(a′) =M ′(a), contradicting
the assumption that a was the first such agent in σ(M). uunionsq
Corollary 2. Given an instance I of POM, every agent permutation is a sig-
nature of exactly one Pareto optimal matching in I.
We can now present a necessary and sufficient condition, checkable in linear
time, for a POM instance to admit a unique Pareto optimal matching.
Theorem 4. An instance I of POM admits a unique Pareto optimal matching
M if and only if every agent is matched in M with his/her first choice.
Proof. Let M be the unique Pareto optimal matching in I. Since every agent
permutation is a signature of M , G(M) contains no edges. Then every agent
must be matched to his/her first choice.
Conversely, let M be a matching in I in which every agent is matched with
his/her first choice. Then if M ′ is any matching in I such that M ′ 6= M , it
follows that M ≺M ′. Hence M is the unique Pareto optimal matching in I. uunionsq
7 Concluding remarks
We conclude with an open problem. The basic POM definition can be generalized
by permitting agents to contain ties in their preference lists (i.e. to rank equally
two or more houses). In this context the definition of the relation ≺ as given in
Section 2, and hence the definition of Pareto optimality, remain unchanged. A
maximum Pareto optimal matching can be found in O(
√
nm log n) time using a
similar reduction to the Assignment problem as described in Section 1 (in this
case ranka,h is the number of houses that a prefers to h). However is the problem
of finding a maximum Pareto optimal matching solvable in O(
√
nm) time?
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